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have a hard time convincing a skeptic without at least attempting to meet
Baker’s challenge, but that doesn’t mean her Christian beliefs are epistemically flawed. I am persuaded that Plantinga’s argument demonstrates that
it is epistemically possible that an ideally situated (epistemically speaking) Christian could be fully rational, justified, and warranted in her beliefs
about God even if she does not meet the challenge embedded in Baker’s
expanded de jure objection. (It’s another question completely whether there
exist any ideally situated Christians. And it is on this point, I suggest, that
Plantinga’s religious epistemology should be pressed.)
In conclusion, while I’m inclined to think that there is some problem
with a Christian that does not (or will not) meet Baker’s challenge in any
way, why assume that the problem is epistemic? What if instead the problem is theological (or maybe practical)? In other words, suppose that a
person’s beliefs are warranted (in Plantinga’s sense) but that she doesn’t
meet Baker’s challenge. Her problem is a failure to follow through on the
Great Commission, to seek to present her beliefs in a persuasive fashion to
her unbelieving friends. This failure, however, doesn’t obviously suggest
that her Christian beliefs are epistemically flawed; the problem might instead be found in her understanding and application of Christian beliefs.

God, Evil, and Design: An Introduction to the Philosophical Issues, by David
O’Connor. Blackwell Publishing, 2008. Pp. 225. $25.00 (paper)
David Basinger, Roberts Wesleyan College
The focus of this book—the problem of evil—has been discussed by philosophers for the past two thousand years. It is a pleasant surprise, accordingly, to find a treatment of this issue from a new perspective, as is the case
with God, Evil, and Design.
O’Connor’s discussion of the relationship between God and evil focuses on two questions. The first is “whether the idea of God squares with the
fact that many terrible things happen for no apparent reason, or whether
that fact is good reason to think there is no God” (p. 7). The second is
“whether, all things considered, the good as well as the bad, it is reasonable to conclude that God [exists and] is the original source and cause of
the universe” (p. 8).
We are invited by O’Connor to conduct our consideration of these questions behind a “veil of ignorance.” Specifically, we are invited to suspend
any personal religious beliefs when considering the relationship between
evil and God’s existence and also to pretend to know nothing about religion or philosophy when considering God as a possible cause for our
universe. O’Connor grants that stepping behind the veil in this sense is
not easy. But it is possible, he contends, and can enable us to conduct a
neutral, unbiased investigation.
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O’Connor rightly notes that the question of whether evil renders belief in the concept of God unreasonable actually requires consideration
of two more specific questions: (1) whether simultaneous belief in God
and evil is logically impossible and (2) whether belief in God in the face
of evil, even if not self-contradictory, is improbable, given the evil we
experience.
The focus of O’Connor’s discussion of the logical possibility of God’s
existence, given evil, is the well-known debate between J. L. Mackie and
Alvin Plantinga. After reviewing for us Mackie’s contention that the simultaneous existence of both a good, omnipotent God and evil is logically impossible if we assume, as we must, that a good, omnipotent being
will eliminate evil completely, O’Connor concludes that Mackie fails to
prove a contradiction between the idea of God and the fact of evil because
Mackie does not rule out the possibility of some additional relevant fact
that would make it possible for God and evil to co-exist. O’Connor then
considers and ultimately concurs with Alvin Plantinga’s stronger claim
that simultaneous belief in the existence of evil and God can be established as possible because it is possible that God created a world containing persons with freedom that cannot be controlled by God (libertarian
freedom), that the misuse of this freedom is the cause of evil, and that this
world, even with this evil, is on balance good.
This still leaves us with the need to determine whether the amount and
types of evil we experience render God’s existence improbable. But before discussing this variation of his first question, O’Connor invites us to
consider his second question: Whether it is reasonable from behind the
veil to believe that God is the ultimate cause of all. As O’Connor sees it,
there are basically three explanatory hypotheses for the remarkable order,
regularity, and complexity we undeniably experience in the natural realm:
(1) the chance hypothesis, which postulates that this is the only universe
and that both natural order and the initial conditions at the Big Bang are
due to chance; (2) the multiverse hypothesis, which postulates that this
universe is only one of many, thus increasing the chance of the evil we
experience coming about; and (3) the design hypothesis, which postulates
that our universe, including the initial conditions at the Big Bang, exists
by intentional design.
O’Connor acknowledges that all three hypotheses face significant difficulties. But he focuses his discussion on those difficulties facing the design hypothesis, which include the problem of positing a non-physical
ultimate cause, the problem of how God can actualize divine intentions if
humans possess libertarian freedom, and the problem of understanding
how a world designed by a good God could have the amounts and types
of evil we experience. His “behind the veil” conclusion is that, while the
world as we experience it might give us some reason to assume that the
ultimate cause of all is outside of the natural order, the idea of God as this
ultimate cause “would not come up as the overall best explanation,” given
the evil we experience (p. 107).
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We then return to the question of whether God’s existence is probable,
given evil. Specifically, O’Connor asks us to consider from behind the veil
whether the fact that evil makes the belief that God is the ultimate cause
of our world improbable offers us a rational basis for believing that God
probably does not exist. He first reviews Paul Draper’s attempt to show
that, all things considered, the belief that there exists a God who is responsible for a world with so much evil is quite unreasonable and William
Rowe’s argument that none of the allegedly justifying reasons for evil offered by theists even remotely justifies the number of types of horrific evil
we experience and thus that there quite probably is no God. O’Connor
then assesses sympathetically responses by Stephen Wykstra and Peter
van Inwagen, who both argue in some fashion that we aren’t in possession
of an objective standard for “excess evil” in relation to which we can say
that the amount of evil we experience counts against the existence of God.
His conclusion, though, is that since this skeptical line of defense renders
God virtually indefensible and may well undercut the concept of morality theists want to affirm, this line of reasoning does not defeat the claim
that, “judging from the facts of the world, the existence of God is or seems
improbable” (p. 168).
Nor, O’Connor maintains, do the attempts by theists such as Richard
Swinburne and John Hick to explain the occurrence of evils in our world
fare any better, as their appeal to human freedom doesn’t explain why a
good God would grant freedom without restraint or exception, given the
horrendous evils human freedom can and does produce, and their appeals to an afterlife don’t justify evils experienced in this life.
So where does O’Connor believe all this leaves us? What we found
while behind the veil, he maintains, is that although our experience of
seemingly pointless evil doesn’t render God’s existence impossible, “the
facts of evil in the world [are] strong enough evidence to make it improbable that there is a God.” And we found that an open investigation does
not support the belief in a perfect supernatural creator as “the best explanation of the origin and nature of our universe” (p. 213).
But what if we come out from behind the veil and assess the situation
as believers? What we have discovered behind the veil, O’Connor tells us,
is enough to discredit attempts by “evidentialist” theists to demonstrate
on the basis of objective data that God exists as the creator of all. However,
this does not necessarily mean, he concludes, that a person cannot justifiably believe in the existence and creative activity of God. For it may be
the case that the believer is sincere in reporting experience of the divine
and “so long as the believer does not suppose this counts as evidence, it
can ground the believer’s religious outlook, and perhaps enable it to withstand even strong evidence pointing the other way” (p. 221).
Overall, I find O’Connor’s work impressive. He is a very clear, accessible writer. His approach is comprehensive in that it covers all the important issues. And his discussion of the key figures and perspectives is unfailingly complete and fair. I do, though, have three significant concerns.
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First, the freewill defense O’Connor outlines is based on the assumption
that God has granted humans “full-time libertarian freedom,” by which
he seems to mean that God has decided to grant all persons libertarian
freedom all the time “without constraint or exception.” My understanding
is quite different. As I see it, while all freewill theists do believe that God
cannot both grant a person freedom and control the outcome of its use,
most freewill theists believe God has retained the right to withhold freedom from any given person in relation to any given decision at any time.
This does, of course, rightly leave the freewill theist open to the important
question of why a good God has not chosen more frequently to exercise
this veto power. But it also allows for the possibility of interventive divine
activity in our world—for example, through intervention in our lives in
response to prayer—in a way that gives God more control over how the
world runs, including more control over the ultimate outcome of things in
relation to evil, than O’Connor believes to be the case.
Second, O’Connor’s invitation to step behind the veil of ignorance—
to pretend that we aren’t theists or nontheists or pretend we don’t know
anything about religion or philosophy—seems to me both unrealistic and
unhelpful. I agree completely that we should consider all points of view,
including those differing from ours, as openly and honestly as possible.
But the idea that we can actually suspend belief for the sake of analysis seems to me quite inconsistent with contemporary theories of belief
formation, which hold that how we understand and interpret new information is always pre-volitionally shaped significantly by our basic beliefs
about the world, including any basic religious or moral beliefs that have
been formed by our interaction with the socio-cultural settings with which
we have had contact. If this is correct, then the assumption that stepping
behind the veil will give us neutral, unbiased information is a dangerous
myth in that it can unjustifiably give more rational credence to the results
of our deliberations than is deserved.
This brings us to my greatest concern: O’Connor’s basic epistemic assumption that we can in some meaningful sense determine objectively
whether certain perspectives about God and the relationship between God
and evil are reasonable. I have argued and continue to believe, rather, that
in relation to any significant metaphysical or moral issue on which there
are competing explanatory hypotheses, there exist no objective, non-question-begging criteria apart from self-consistency for determining whether
any given perspective is in fact the most reasonable. And if this is so, then
O’Connor’s implicit contention that believers must add faith to reason to
remain believers in the face of evil while nonbelievers can rely solely on
reason is misguided. It is rather the case that theists and nontheists alike
must choose by “faith” among competing self-consistent options with respect to God and evil, with none of the self-consistent choices bringing
with it, in principle, greater objective, neutral support.
Nevertheless, I still recommend this book highly for anyone with an
interest in the topic.

